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THE "NORMAL" SUCCESSES AND F AlLURES OF FEMINISM 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
VICI'ORIA NOURSE* 
INTRODUCI'ION 
To write of feminist reform in the criminal law is to write of 
simultaneous success and failure. We have seen marked changes in 
the doctrines and the practice of rape law, domestic violence law, and 
the law of self-defense.1 There is not a criminal law casebook in 
America today, nor a state statute book, that does not tell this story.2 
Yet for all of this success, we also live in a world in which reform 
seems to suffer routine failures. Many believe, for example, that 
feminist reforms have rid rape law of the resistance requirement; 
however, recent scholarship makes it clear that the resistance 
requirement has not disappeared.3 Similarly, many believe that 
feminism has rid us of the marital rape exemption; in fact, there is 
evidence that marital rape immunities remain on the statute books.4 
Finally, many believe that reform has brought widespread judicial 
acceptance of battered women's self-defense claims; but the battle 
over this defense in the law reviews and popular media testifies to the 
continuing lack of settlement of the underlying issues.5 
* My thanks to Anita Bernstein for reading and commenting on this Essay and to 
Roseann Kitson for excellent research assistance. 
1. Even its skeptics have conceded that feminism has been one of the most influential 
developments in the past fifty years of the criminal law. See George P. Fletcher, The Fall and 
Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275, 279 (1998) ("The only academic 
movement of the 1980s that made an impact on criminal law was feminism."); Sanford H. 
Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REv. 943, 974 (1999) 
("Feminism, on the other hand, is the one major movement of the period that has had a 
significant impact on the shape of the criminal law."). 
2 See, e.g., JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 609-35 
(defensive force), 1099-1155 (rape) (3d ed. 1996); MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS 
IN CRIMINAL LAW 385-424 (self defense), 721-52 (rape) (4th ed. 1999). 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 46-64. 
5. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE 
THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 62-66, 101-12 (1997) (deploring the development of battered 
woman syndrome evidence in the context of self-defense); David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, 
The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 67, 68 (1997) (urging 
that courts abandon battered woman syndrome); see also infra text accompanying note 88. 
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Some have seen these events as reason for pronouncing feminism 
a failure despite its obvious successes. In my view, the interesting 
questions are about how reform both succeeds and fails, 
simultaneously and obviously. Indeed, the very transparency of these 
conflicts should merit our attention not only for feminism's sake, but 
also for the sake of understanding how law maintains apparent 
consistency and, at the same time, perpetuates injustice. One need 
not be a sophisticated feminist to see the difficulties of a rape law that 
declares women need not resist but then requires resistance, or the 
deceptiveness of a legal consensus that announces marital rape 
exemptions have been discarded when they have not. These are test 
cases in how the law carries forward that which it denies. For 
feminists, they are test cases in how the law perpetuates sexism as it 
proclaims sexism dead. 
These are large questions that cannot be tackled in a short essay. 
I want to suggest here, however, a couple of angles to the problem as 
they relate to feminism. Old norms do not die; they are resurrected 
in empty spaces, deliberate ambiguities, and new rhetorics.6 Indeed, 
old norms not only do not die, but also live alongside, and are 
perpetuated by, the denial that they still live. It is in this sense that 
we may come to see the failures of feminist reform as essentially 
"normal." By this, I do not mean that the recurring problems of 
feminism and the criminal law are a good thing. Rather, I use 
"normal" in two senses of the word. First, these failures are "normal" 
in the sense that they arise from upwardly mobile social norms-in 
this case, norms about intimate relationships. Social norms have the 
power to overwhelm the best-intentioned of reforms. When rules 
that were supposed to go away nevertheless stay (such as resistance 
rules or marital rape exemptions), they stay because the new rules are 
interpreted in light of old, apparently discarded, social 
understandings. Failure is also "normal" in a second sense, the sense 
that it is not accidental but structurally determined. Reform is 
typically a "marbled" affair-the rich veins of new law cut across the 
"plain vanilla" of settled, conventional belief. This is a function not 
only of the power of social norms, but also the demands of the 
institutional processes essential to create reform. Legislatures cannot 
survive without the compromises and deliberate ambiguities that 
6. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). Although I do believe that rhetoric changes over time in ways that 
"preserve" older norms, my work here avoids the historical; I am interested, instead, in the 
simultaneity of contrary social and legal norms. 
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nurture reform's future failures. 
If this is right, feminist reforms have a kind of built-in, albeit 
unpredictable, capacity for failure; like the apple harboring the worm, 
they harbor the possibility of their own undoing. I say this not 
because I believe that failure's normalcy makes reform futile, but for 
precisely the opposite reason- because it makes the need for 
continued reform equally "normal." In what follows, I examine this 
possibility-the possibility of simultaneous success and failure-in 
three particular contexts: rape reform, marital rape reform, and 
reforms relating to battered woman syndrome evidence. 
SUCCESSES AND F AlLURES 
There are two major areas in which feminism's influence in the 
statutory criminal law is seen as important: rape and self-defense law.7 
There are reasons, I believe, to doubt this emphasis. I have argued 
elsewhere and continue to believe that this very categorization 
marginalizes the feminist problem.8 Feminist issues can be found in 
the criminal law every time a criminal statute touches an intimate 
relationship, that is, a relationship governed by society's norms about 
the proper relationship of men and women, whether the "doctrinal" 
issue falls under the heading of murder or manslaughter, self-defense 
or provocation. Here, however, I will focus on the traditional areas in 
which reform has been claimed and consider common claims of 
success against reality. 
A. Rape and Resistance: Deliberate Ambiguities 
Rape reform is often cited as the most obvious example of 
feminist influence on the criminallaw.9 And there is no doubt that 
reform efforts of the 1970s and 1980s made substantial changes in 
doctrine and statute.10 At least as a formal matter, these reform 
7. See KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 609-35, 1099-1155; MOSKOVITZ, supra note 2, at 
385-424,721-52. 
8. See Victoria Nourse, Feminism and the Criminal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME 
AND JUSTICE (rev. ed. forthcoming 2001); see also Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modem 
Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1334 (1997). 
9. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1, at 279 (citing, as the first evidence of feminism's 
influence, Susan Estrich's critique of rape law); Kadish, supra note 1, at 953 (equating feminism 
with changing "the law of rape in America."). 
10. See Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six 
Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 117 (1991), reprinted in part in LAW & SOCIETY: 
READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW 522, 522 (Stewart Macaulay et a!. eds .• 1995) 
[hereinafter LAW & SOCIETY] ("During the past twenty years there has been a sweeping effort 
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efforts ousted the worst doctrinal requirements: the prompt 
complaint rule, corroboration requirements and even jury instructions 
suggesting the incredibility of the charge.11 Surprisingly, large 
discrepancies remain between these reforms and the law as it stands 
today in practice. Indeed, this is becoming a staple of traditional 
criminal law scholarship. For example, Steven Schulhofer has 
recently argued, in book-length treatment, that rape law suffers from 
a kind of "myth of reform," in which adherents and critics alike 
appear to join hands in celebrating a set of reforms that should be 
seen as partial at best.12 
One prominent example of such a "myth" is the resistance 
requirement; another is the very definition of force. Although courts 
and commentators have seemed to assume that the resistance 
requirement is virtually dead,n we are now told by the criminal law 
academy that feminists never really rid rape law of the resistance rule. 
Schulhofer writes: "'resistance to the utmost' is an untenable 
requirement that no modern court would attempt to enforce, but the 
law still puts the burden on the woman to resist in some fashion. "14 
Similarly, if reformers thought that they shifted the focus from force 
to reform rape laws in this country."). 
11. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 42 (1987) (noting that resistance, prompt complaint, 
and corroboration rules have formally been repealed); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED 
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 29-30 (1998). "The 
corroboration requirement and special cautionary instructions to the jury came under concerted 
attack, and in the course of the 1970s virtually every state repealed these discriminatory rules." 
/d. at 30. 
12. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that "[d]espite three decades of intensive 
public discussion and numerous statutory reforms, the problem of rape has not been 'solved."'). 
Schulhofer's point is consistent with feminist scholarship. See, e.g., LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & 
JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLmCS OF SEX 270 (1998) ("To the degree that 
past rape reforms have begun from or continued the common law understanding of rape as 
forcible sexual imposition, they do not correspond to modem understandings of what is right 
and wrong about heterosexual conduct."); Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape 
Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 960 ("Rape law reformers sought and won only a partial 
victory."). 
13. See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986) (describing the California 
legislature's repeal of the resistance requirement and explaining the various reasons why "the 
entire concept of resistance to sexual assault has been called into question"); PAUL H. 
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW§ 14.6, at 752 (1997) ("To require resistance, as some jurisdictions 
once did, is to require victims to put themselves in danger of additional injuries .... " (emphasis 
added)). 
14. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 176 (emphasis added). "Many states continue to 
require a 'reasonable' amount of physical resistance. And where the law on the books has 
abolished formal resistance requirements, some resistance-physical and otherwise-remains 
necessary in practice .... " /d. at 127; see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 957 ("Reformers 
changed courts' evaluation of resistance by degree, but not in kind."). Indeed, some states still 
require "earnest resistance" by statute. !d. at 965 & n.69 ("States that maintain an earnest 
resistance requirement in their statutes today include Alabama, Oregon, and West Virginia."). 
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to consent, they have not; many obviously wrongful threats still do 
not, in and of themselves, support a rape charge. For example, the 
school principal who obtains sex by threatening his pupil that she will 
not graduate does not commit rape,15 nor does the supervisor who 
obtains sex by threatening to fire his subordinate.16 Of course, we 
have known of this for some time. If it was not already clear from 
Catharine MacKinnon's theoretical critique,17 it was crystal clear in 
Susan Estrich's work, Real Rape,l8 that resistance might reassert itself 
and that coercive threats might remain unpunished. 
The question I want to ask is not whether this has happened but 
why it has happened. In my own view, resistance has resurfaced not 
because courts have failed, because feminism's theories of rape are 
wrong, or because all would be better if we simply treated rape as a 
crime against autonomy. Schulhofer seems to be on to something 
when he emphasizes society's continuing ambivalence about social 
norms of consent and coercion- the very basic concepts upon which 
rape law depends.19 For all of the work on rape reform legislation, the 
legal concepts of force and consent were left largely untouched in the 
1970s and 1980s.20 Not surprisingly, perhaps, courts have found 
themselves reaching out to resistance to give some content to the 
conceptual ambiguities left behind. Resistance has resurfaced to 
resolve the normative ambivalence of force and consent-if the victim 
physically resists, courts and juries believe they can be fairly sure that 
she did not consent and that physical force was used to accomplish 
sex.21 
15. See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1104 (Mont. 1990); SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, 
at 2-3. 
16. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 
132-34. 
17. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 
(1991). 
18. ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 18-19 (describing studies showing prosecutors' reliance on 
the victim's resistance), 67-71 (discussing the inadequacies of the "physical force" rule in simple 
rape cases). 
19. SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 47-68. 
20. See id. at 31-36. 
21. Courts have long recognized that "[t]he importance of resistance lay in its relationship 
to the issues of force and consent .... By establishing resistance, the state was able to prove the 
key elements of the crime: the accused's intent to use force in order to accomplish an act of 
sexual intercourse, and the woman's nonconsent .... " People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 115 (Cal. 
1986). It is for this reason that some writers have recently urged that we revive the resistance 
requirement and reverse its logic. Michelle Anderson argues that, rather than seeking to 
exclude claims by women who do not resist, the law should find that resistance, verbal or 
physical, includes tllose claims-that "resistance cannot be necessary to obtain conviction, but it 
should be sufficient." Anderson, supra note 12, at 960. The argument addressed here focuses 
on resistance as an exclusionary, rather than an inclusionary, rule. 
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In this world, resistance becomes the law's measure both of force 
and of nonconsent, long after it has been officially ousted from our 
doctrine. There is no doubt that resistance seems like a "bright line," 
but it is only as "bright" as the norms upon which it depends. Put 
another way, the resurgence of resistance assumes and requires the 
"scripts" of female and male responsibility that Lynne Henderson 
warned us about so long ago.22 Being a date or a wife or even a 
colleague means that courts and lawyers and jurors presume that 
interactions between the two parties are voluntary, consensual, and 
"normal," which means no coercion, no rape. In other words, the 
relationship, implied or real, spells consent to which resistance 
provides counterproof. This is not simply a theoretical point: ask a 
prosecutor about the key problem in a nonstranger rape case, and she 
will tell you, '"It all comes down to the same nitty-gritty nuts-and-
bolts issues: the relationship between the parties is going to be key in 
any rape prosecution."'23 
From there, it is not hard to see why jurors or judges look for 
"her resistance" -it negates the implications of the relationship.24 If 
victims are assumed to have consented to have sex with those they are 
dating, then, by resisting, the victim tends to make us see that we 
should not be so ready to infer consent simply from the prior 
22. Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 131 (1992). 
23. Lisa R. Eskow, Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and 
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 699 (1996) (quoting Frank Passaglia, 
Director of the Sexual Assault Unit at the San Francisco District Attorney's Office). Empirical 
work tends to confirm this judgment. Early studies of rape reform focused on "objective" 
measures like conviction rates and tended to show no "progress." Horney & Spohn, supra note 
10, at 535 ("[L]egal changes did not produce the dramatic results anticipated by reformers."). 
Later studies have revised that estimate on one score: that rape reform has had some effect in 
producing "a climate more conducive to the full prosecution of simple rape" (what I would call 
cases of "relationship-rape"). Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Law 
Reform on the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 861, 884 (1996) (finding "some evidence," id. at 882, that rape reforms have 
increased the number of relationship-rapes in the system through increased reporting and 
changes in police and prosecutor attitudes-even if conviction and dismissal rates remain 
unaffected by legal changes). 
24. One may ask, if relationships have such a powerful force, why have courts required 
resistance even in so-called "stranger" cases? Schulhofer, for example, opens his book with an 
example of a woman accosted by a stranger and carried into the woods; she was overcome by 
fear and did not resist the stranger's sexual attack. The jury convicted the defendant of sexual 
assault, but the appellate court reversed the verdict finding no force, presumably because the 
victim did not resist. Put another way, it was the victim's responsibility to show by her actions 
that this was not a voluntary "romp in the woods." SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 1-2 
(discussing People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)). Therein lies the painful 
possibility that the law presumes that women are in voluntary sexual relationships unless they 
prove to the contrary. The baseline here is the "romp in the woods" or voluntary sexual 
adventure; in short, the norm is that women are "in" a relationship unless they prove to the 
contrary. 
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relationship. The relationship provides the normative baseline from 
which consent and force are abstracted. Of course, as feminists have 
noted, it also places the burden on the victim to "prove" that she did 
not consent and that the rape was committed by force.25 Here, as 
elsewhere, the law places the onus on the victim to negate the 
implications of relationship; violent and otherwise, relationships are 
her responsibility from which she can only abstract her identity (even 
her physical autonomy) by showing physical force. 
This analysis extends as well to the problems that have arisen in 
the context of defining force in the law of rape. Traditionally, only 
physical force has sufficed to meet rape law's idea of what constitutes 
illegal force.26 Of course, this leaves out a good deal of what most 
normal Americans would call "coercion"; indeed, it leaves out what 
the criminal law-in fraud, extortion, and robbery-calls "force."27 A 
high school girl believes she will lose her diploma if she does not have 
sex: no rape because no physical force. 28 A child believes she will be 
returned to a detention home if she does not have sex: no rape 
because no physical force.29 An employee believes that she will lose 
her job: no rape because no physical force. 30 All of these cases 
involve legitimate, socially-sanctioned relationships between victim 
and offender (student/teacher, employee/employer, foster-
child/parent). Those relationships provide the baseline of 
"voluntary" interaction (implied consent) that the victim must rebut 
by showing something that is obviously inconsistent with consent-
physical force. But think about that: does anyone really think that the 
25. See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 69-71; MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 1303-04. 
26. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Mont. 1990) (defining "force" as 
physical compulsion because the Montana rape statute failed to define the term); Jane E. 
Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit"': A Feminist 
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 417-18 (1993) ("Today, however, courts rarely 
consider it unlawful to deceive someone into agreeing to sex .... It is both a tort and a crime to 
take money by false pretenses, but in most jurisdictions it is lawful to obtain consent to sex by 
intentionally deceiving one's partner."). 
27. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 39, 139 
(1998) (explaining that courts have applied constructive force requirements in the context of 
robbery and burglary to include fraudulent representations but have not always applied this 
same concept in the case of sex induced by fraud); Larson, supra note 26, at 417 ("Although 
force and fraud are equated when it comes to money, the same analysis is not usually extended 
to sex."). 
28. See State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990). The Montana statute was 
subsequently amended to include a definition of "force" in an attempt to solve this problem. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (1999). 
29. See Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), affd, 542 A.2d 
1335 (Pa. 1988). 
30. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994); SCHUlliOFER, supra note 11. at 133-
34. 
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girl in the 4-H club (conned into intercourse with a "doctor" she met 
there) really wanted to have sex?31 If what was taken from her were 
money, of course, these would be crimes of fraud or extortion. And 
yet, rape law's idea of force-as-physical-force leaves us with the 
unpalatable conclusion that the same conduct should fare differently 
when what is obtained is sex.32 
Few believe that the resistance requirement should be a part of 
rape doctrine; even fewer believe that the girl taken off her bike at 
the local park has not been raped because she did not resist. If I am 
right that the general consensus condemns these rules and results, 
why is it that the law continues to embrace them-decades after 
declared feminist "success" in the revision of the criminal law?33 
Indeed, the kinds of problems I am talking about are exceedingly 
conventional, even passe, from a feminist standpoint. Here arises the 
question of banal inequalities-inequalities that, if seen, would be 
condemned but yet somehow escape reform. We know that the law 
takes its cues from the social relationships involved; and we have long 
known, from law and society scholarship, just how powerful social 
norms are in defeating the best-laid plans at reform.34 The question 
here is not simply about the power of norms to shape law or how our 
notion of intimate relationships shapes the criminal law. Instead, it is 
how outdated norms may perpetuate themselves in a world that would, 
all other things being equal, reject them. The 4-H club case and the 
31. Schulhofer discusses this case in which the defendant, Waites, who met his victim and 
others at a 4-H club, posed as a doctor who was testing the victim for learning disabilities and, 
based on that pretext, ordered the victim to disrobe, fondled her, and subjected her to fellatio 
and intercourse. Waites was convicted of rape, but the conviction was overturned by the 
appellate court because there was no "force." See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 45 (citing 
State v. Waites, No. 93-L-009, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 3651, at *15-21 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 19, 
1994)). 
32 See ESTRICH, supra note 11, at 70; Larson, supra note 26, at 417-18. 
33. Although some state courts have openly struggled with the problem of "force," and 
some legislatures have even attempted to deal with obvious loopholes, the most common type 
of reform addressing issues of coercion in rape focuses on defined categories of those most 
likely to abuse trust, such as psychiatrists, or ministers, or school teachers, or general provisions 
relating to specific classes of victims, such as children. See Falk, supra note 27, at 118-19 ("No 
doubt wary of casting their nets too wide, state legislatures have been quite conservative, 
tending to enact very specific provisions to cover a few factual scenarios rather than passing 
global fraud statutes."). Indeed, the very fact that legislatures have sought to limit their reforms 
to particular kinds of relationships (for example, psychiatrist/patient), reflects and reaffirms the 
notion that the relationships between the parties provide the norms that govern our judgments 
about the propriety of sexual relationships. See id. 
34. See Lawrence Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 
351, 364-65 (1969) (arguing that reform is typically "half ratification" of an existing social order 
and half "real change."); see id. at 365 ("A change that conforms to what most of the public 
already wishes to do or which calls for slight, familiar, acceptable change of behavior is far more 
palatable and far more likely to succeed."). 
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detention-home case are not difficult cases for most people. But 
courts have not found these cases to be easy bellwethers of injustice; 
indeed, some have found no difficulty in rejecting resistance as 
doctrinal rule and then reinventing it for the most vulnerable-for 
young girls threatened with no diplomas or detention homes or 
violating "doctor's" orders. 
One possible answer to this development may simply be vision; 
the old, discarded norms (the rules about resistance) are in some way 
"hidden," conventionally believed to be discarded or long-ago-
reformed. After all, courts reinventing the resistance requirement do 
not say that they are reinventing the doctrinal rule; they say that they 
are applying the basic notions of force and consent.35 Similarly, courts 
applying the stranger-rape-as-paradigm rule do not say that rape only 
happens outside voluntary relationships; they say that they are 
defining force.36 Outdated norms resurface but remain undisclosed in 
newer, more ambiguous guises. Here, the discarded norms are 
"hidden" within places of ambiguity-the capacious and socially 
controversial notions of force and consent. The law that disavows 
sexism (by rejecting the doctrinal resistance requirement) ends up 
recapitulating it (by silently reinventing it within the space provided 
by law's ambiguities). 
If that is right, we may begin to see why reform carries the seeds 
of its own failures. Almost all controversial legislation-and that 
includes rape reform-is purchased at the cost of deliberate 
ambiguity. No piece of major legislation can obtain the collective 
consensus required by legislatures without compromise.37 In my view, 
35. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (Where 
"[t]he victim did not physically resist, but rather continued to verbally protest," id. at 1340, the 
court found insufficient evidence of rape; the court characterized the issue as whether there was 
a sufficient "degree of physical force necessary to complete the act of rape in Pennsylvania." !d. 
at 1339 (emphasis added)), affd in part and vacated in part by Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 
A.2d 1161, 1163-64 (Pa. 1994) (rejecting the notion that the victim must resist as a rule, but then 
immediately considering her lack of "physical action" against the defendant in upholding 
finding of no "force" and therefore no rape). 
36. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (The court specifically notes that 
prior consent to sex in a consensual relationship does not negate a charge of rape, id. at 475, but 
finds that defendant did not use "force" in accomplishing sexual intercourse, id. at 476.). 
37. This is not only a product of collective action problems within legislatures, but also a 
more general problem with any legal reform in areas of intense social conflict. See ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION 
AND COLLABORATION 61 (1997) ("In most cases, the law can only work as a supplement (and 
not a replacement) for informal enforcement of the norm ... law is the formalization of what 
has already attained strength as a social or political norm."); Stewart Macaulay, Law and 
Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, reprinted in part in LAW & SOCIETY, supra 
note 10, at 14, 15 ("Our society deals with conflict in many ways, but avoidance and evasion are 
important ones .... We fmd social consensus at a high level of abstraction and so keep our 
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there is no shame in these compromises; they are inevitable and 
essential.38 The problem is that deliberate ambiguity, purchased now 
for a small sum, may exact much larger costs in the future. Indeed, it 
may become the nurturing grounds for the reform failures of the next 
generation. For within the heart of that ambiguity, old norms will live 
on, upwardly mobile and yet unseen. 
That old, discarded norms might survive post-reform is not only 
predictable because legislatures trade in deliberate ambiguity, but 
also because ambiguity nurtures overtly rejected norms. Ambiguity 
works to hide discarded or unlikely norms by making it difficult to 
obtain the information about precisely what the norm is. As scholars 
of norm development tell us, lack of information and publicity may 
"be a determinative obstacle to societal norm formation."39 If, for 
example, everyone believes that the resistance requirement has been 
eliminated, then they are very unlikely to support the need for further 
reform, even if it is quite clear that they would support such reform if 
all the information were well-known. The law can exacerbate this 
situation by inhibiting information flow- by burying the old rules 
within new and deliberately ambiguous guises. If everyone believes 
that rape law has been "reformed" to eliminate the resistance 
requirement, and the law only reinvents the resistance requirement in 
difficult-to-see places like "force and consent," then norms 
challenging the consensus will be weak (even if we can predict that 
they would be strong in the presence of full information).40 Indeed, 
the great irony is that the very idea of "reform"- to the extent that it 
suggests that we have "solved" a problem of major societal 
controversy-nurtures its own contradictions by tending to inhibit the 
doctrines ambiguous or contradictory."). 
38. To the extent that legal authorities seek to minimize conflict with "citizens' hostility" 
they may actually maximize compliance with a partial shift in norms that would not otherwise 
be possible. See, e.g., TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990), reprinted in pan in 
LAW & SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 474, 476 ("If the effectiveness of legal authorities ultimately 
depends on voluntary acceptance of their actions, then authorities are placed in the position of 
balancing public support against the effective regulation of public behavior."). 
39. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 338, 402 (1997); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 180 (1991) ("Players need information as well as effective 
power. In the absence of adequate information, a continuing relationship among empowered 
people may not be cooperative."); id. at 181 ("The hypothesis predicts that departures from 
conditions of reciprocal power, ready sanctioning opportunities, and adequate information are 
likely to impair the emergence of welfare-maximizing norms."). 
40. See AXELROD, supra note 37, at 58-59 (arguing that "social proof," the proof of 
correctness of social behavior gleaned from observing others, "is a major mechanism in the 
support of norms," because it provides information to the actor seeking to comply with 
prevailing social norms). 
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flow of information about its own inevitable "compromises." 
In short, what amounts to a necessary feature of the legislative 
process is likely to breed and nurture a condition of reform's 
simultaneous victories and defeats. In this sense, it seems almost 
predictable that rape reform would cycle between success and failure. 
Predictable perhaps, but unfortunate nevertheless: unfortunate 
because it sustains law's hypocrisy; more than unfortunate because it 
renders banal a set of inequalities whose casualties may be the most 
vulnerable among us. 
B. Marital Rape: Complexity 
If the resurgence of the resistance requirement tells us something 
about the power of ambiguity to nurture older, discarded norms, then 
the fate of marital rape rules tells a similar story under a different 
title. One of the very earliest crusades in the area of rape law focused 
on the obvious inequalities of a law that failed to protect married 
women from rape. Eliminating marital rape exemptions was a 
noteworthy part of many rape reform efforts in the 1970s and 1980s.41 
These efforts quickly appeared to be quite successful, with courts 
doing the heavy-lifting of reform. In the leading case of People v. 
Liberta,42 the New York Court of Appeals held that marital rape 
exemptions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.43 
The Liberta case has since been followed by a number of courts;44 and 
41. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 30 (stating that the marital exemption was one of 
the two principal problems focused on by rape reformers in the 1970s). 
42. 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984). 
43. /d. at 573 (holding that no rational basis exists to distinguish marital rape and 
nonmarital rape, thus marital exemption in New York statute violates the Equal Protection 
Clause); see also People v. DeStefano, 467 N.Y.S.2d 506, 515-16 (Suffolk County Ct. 1983) 
(holding that a wife has a right to the protection that law provides against rape for non-spouses 
and is denied equal protection of the law by the existence of a husband's statutory immunity in 
the case of marital rape). 
44. See, e.g., Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (holding that there is 
no rational basis for distinguishing between marital and nonmarital rape, thus a marital 
exemption violates equal protection); Williams v. State, 494 So. 2d 819, 830 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1986) (holding that a marital exemption to forcible sodomy statute had no rational basis and 
thus violated equal protection); People v. M. D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(marital distinction between lesser sexual assault offenses violates equal protection); People v. 
Horvath, 584 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (extending Liberta to sexual abuse in the 
first degree); Shunn v. State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987) (agreeing with Liberta that no 
rational basis exists for distinguishing marital rape and nonmarital rape). But see People v. 
Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 918 (Colo. 1982) (en bane) (holding that the marital rape exemption is 
neither arbitrary nor irrational); People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1981) (en bane) 
(upholding marital rape exemption under rational basis review). 
A number of courts have relied upon arguments similar to those asserted in Liberta to 
construe statutes or common law crimes to avoid inequalities of treatment between marital and 
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its rationale has been applied not only to full marital exemptions, but 
also to marital immunities for lower-level rape crimes. Where 
statutes create marital exemptions for crimes other than first-degree 
rape, courts have found that these exemptions also violate equal 
protection. 45 
The only problem with this story is that it is incomplete, although 
it is repeated so often that it has become as good as the truth. 
Proponents and detractors alike extol the demise of the marital rape 
exemption46 as reason to celebrate feminist victory or to declare an 
end to the need for statutory reform. However, the ideas that shape 
the marital exemption have not died and, if the equal protection cases 
are any measure, obvious inequalities remain on the nation's statute 
books.47 In Virginia, the judge, if he or she thinks it in the best 
nonmarital rape. See, e.g., State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(rejecting common law "marital unity" and privacy arguments for marital rape exemption); 
State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126, 1128-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting common law 
arguments for interspousal exception to Florida sexual battery statute); Warren v. State, 336 
S.E.2d 221, 223, 226 (Ga. 1985) (holding that no implicit marital exclusion exists in either rape 
or aggravated sodomy statutes while citing with approval cases striking down such exclusions on 
equal protection grounds); State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Neb. 1986) (refusing to 
recognize a spousal exemption from a statute and stating that "none of the justifications for the 
exclusion have any merit in modem society"); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 
852-55 (Va. 1984) (rejecting common law justifications for marital rape exception as inconsistent 
with autonomy and equal rights of women); see also Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 
591, 594-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting defendant's argument that criminalizing marital rape 
violated his rights of privacy and equal protection). 
45. See, e.g., M. D., 595 N.E.2d at 713 (holding that Illinois violates equal protection when 
it applies the marital exemption to less serious sexual abuse offenses); People v. Naylor, 609 
N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding marital exemption does not apply to third-
degree sexual abuse; such exception would violate the Equal Protection Clause); Horvath, 584 
N.Y.S.2d at 149 (extending Liberta's equal protection holding to deny a "marital immunity" 
defense to a prosecution for "sexual abuse in the first degree"); People v. Bruce, 556 N.Y.S.2d 
782, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (rejecting lower court's reversal of jury finding on attempted 
rape in the first degree because of its concern about the "marital context" and relying upon 
Liberta's equal protection rationale albeit implicitly extending it to the "attempted rape" 
context); People v. Prudent, 539 N.Y.S.2d 651, 651 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1989) (rejecting defendant's 
argument that Libena's equal protection rationale does not apply to lesser sexual offenses). 
46. It is conventional wisdom among criminal law scholars that the marital rape exemption 
is dead or at least dying. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference 
Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1783 
(1992) ("The reformed statutes did make some substantive changes by abolishing the marital 
rape exemption .... "). 
47. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 11, at 43 ("[T]he great majority of the states still retain 
an exemption for marital rape under some circumstances."); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and 
Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Oct. 2000) 
(manuscript at 1, on file with author) ("A majority of states still retain some form of the 
common law regime: they criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within 
marriage, subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create 
special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions."). Robin West's influential article on 
equal protection and marital rape first set forth the problem. See Robin L. West, Equality 
Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Founeenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45 
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interest of the parties' marriage, may dismiss some marital charges 
altogether even in cases where the court has made a finding of guilt.48 
Similarly, in Arizona, spousal rape with force may be a misdemeanor 
while nonspousal rape without force is a serious felony.49 
The differentials in penalties are not the only ways in which 
marital rape offenses are treated separately. Some offenses that are 
treated as rape or wrongful sexual contact for strangers are treated 
differently if the parties are married or, in some cases, living together. 
Occasionally, an immunity will still arise on the surface of the statute. 
For example, Louisiana still exempts a husband from guilt for a 
"simple rape" and other sexual offenses by excepting married persons 
from the coverage of the simple rape statute. 5° However, the more 
common statutory disparity is found when statutes limit the repeal of 
an exemption, creating one set of rules for married women and 
another for single women. For example, Mississippi has retained its 
defense of marriage statute exempting "legal spouse[s]" from any 
sexual battery offense.51 That statute is then qualified as if in repeal 
of itself by providing an exception for "forcible sexual penetration 
(1990). 
48. In a marital rape case tried to a Virginia court, despite a finding of guilt, the court may 
defer proceedings and place the defendant on probation if the victim and the State consent. 
Upon completion of probation and therapy, the court may, without the consent of the victim, 
dismiss the charges if it will "promote maintenance of the family unit" and serve the best 
interests of the "complaining witness." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1(C) (Michie 1996). This 
applies to cases in which prosecutors proceed under the special spousal statute or under the 
more traditional statutes, including aggravated cases. See id. §§ 18.2-61(0); 18.2-67.1(0); 18.2-
67.2(0). This scheme clearly allows the judge the discretion to permit his views of the parties' 
relationship to overcome a finding of guilt of marital rape. 
49. The Arizona statute defining a spousal sexual assault (intercourse or oral sexual 
contact) accomplished by force or threatened force is a class six felony which may be reduced, at 
the discretion of the judge, to a misdemeanor with mandatory counseling. ARIZ. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 13-1406.01(B) (West 1989). (LEXIS indicates that this statute is current through 1999). 
The standard nonspousal sexual assault statute, which does not require force but simply sex 
without consent, is a class two felony. /d. § 13-1406(B). 
50. Louisiana defines a "simple rape" as "a rape committed when the anal or vaginal 
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a victim who is not the spouse 
of the offender." LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:43(A) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). 
A similar marital exemption exists for sexual battery and oral sexual battery, which are typically 
nonpenetration touching offenses but may also include cases that fall out of the definition of 
vaginal or anal intercourse. ld. § 14.43.l(A) ("Sexual battery is the intentional engaging in any 
of the following acts with another person, who is not the spouse of the offender, where the 
offender acts without the consent of the victim." (emphasis added)); id. § 14:43.3(A) ("Oral 
sexual battery is the intentional engaging in any of the following acts with another person, who 
is not the spouse of the offender .... "). Such exclusions do not apply, however, in cases of 
aggravated rape, forcible rape, and aggravated sexual battery or aggravated oral sexual battery, 
id. §§ 14:42, 14:42.1; 14:43.2; 14:43.4, setting up a general rule that requires "aggravation" for the 
spousal offender but not for the comparable nonspousal offender. 
51. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (1999). 
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without the consent of the alleged victim."52 But this amendment is 
only a partial repeal. The general nonspousal "sexual battery" statute 
provides only that the conduct be accomplished without consent,53 
although the statute on sexual battery by a spouse requires a showing 
of "force. "54 
Marital rape immunities thus live on between the "general" rape 
statutes and special "spousal" statutes. Understanding precisely how 
this works can often be a rather complex process, rivaling the 
unraveling of tax code regulations. Consider the difficulty of 
Maryland's statutory scheme. Maryland provides that "a person may 
not be prosecuted under [a certain set of statutes] ... if the victim is 
the person's legal spouse," except as provided in that statute.55 The 
statute then goes on to permit prosecution under some sections, but 
only some sections, of the nonspousal statutes. These sections vary 
depending upon whether the parties are separated pursuant to a 
written agreement, separated pursuant to a limited divorce, or if the 
offense is accomplished by using force "against the will and without 
the consent of the person's legal spouse."56 Leaving aside the 
complications of separation agreements and limited divorce,57 the 
still-married spouse has significant hurdles to overcome that are not 
applicable to nonspouses. For example, the spouse-victim must show 
"force," not simply a "threat of force." 58 Thus, a spouse may be 
prosecuted for a forceful rape under the first-degree rape statute59 but 
not for a rape accomplished by "threat of force,"60 as for example, a 
52 /d. (emphasis added). 
53. /d. § 97-3-95(1) ("A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual 
penetration with: (a) Another person without his or her consent; (b) A mentally defective, 
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless person .... "). 
54. /d. § 97-3-99. 
55. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D(a) (1996). 
56. /d.§ 464D(c)(1). 
57. For an attempt to explain some of these distinctions, without any focus on the more 
detailed analysis above, see Lane v. Maryland, 703 A.2d 180 (Md. 1997). 
58. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 464D(c). 
59. Id. § 462(a) (Supp. 1999). 
60. Id. § 464D(c). Maryland's first-degree rape statute covers rapes "by force or threat of 
force," where the defendant "[t]hreatens or places the victim in fear that the victim or any 
person known to the victim will be imminently subjected to death," id. § 462(a)(3), or where the 
defendant commits the offense "aided and abetted" by others. /d. § 462(a)(4). The spousal 
exemption does not bar prosecution under this statute per se, see id. § 464D(c)(2)(i), but 
requires an additional burden-force-thus implicitly excluding anything less, such as a threat 
of force. Therefore, if a husband accomplishes the rape by a threat to kill rather than force 
itself, he may not be prosecuted for the first-degree rape offense; similarly, if he issues a threat 
of force but does not use force and is aided by others, he may not be prosecuted for first-degree 
rape, even if he would be so prosecuted if the victim were a stranger. 
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husband who threatens to kill his wife and proceeds to have vaginal 
intercourse without her consent.61 Moreover, this scheme also 
exempts spousal sexual offenses under some parts of the second-
degree rape statute, some parts of the third-degree sexual offense 
statute, and the full fourth-degree sexual offense statute.62 The 
bottom line is that, in Maryland, if you accomplish sexual intercourse 
by threatening to kill your wife, you have not committed first-degree 
rape, but you have if you similarly threaten a stranger. Indeed, 
because of the way rape is defined, you can threaten to kidnap your 
wife or bring along a few others to "aid and abet" sexual intercourse, 
and this conduct could not be prosecuted as first-degree rape, 
although it would be if the victim were a stranger.63 Maryland, 
unfortunately, is not the only state in which this kind of complex 
"partial repeal" governs marital rape.64 
That these inequalities remain on the statute books should be 
surprising, not only because many believe that the marital rape 
exemption has been banished, but also because marital rape 
differentials have been widely held to be unconstitutional. 65 All of the 
prominent reasons used to justify marital rape rules, such as privacy 
and family harmony, fear of vindictive complaints, and problems of 
proof, have fared poorly in the face of equal protection and statutory 
61. One might argue that the spousal rapist could be prosecuted under Maryland's "sexual 
offense" statutes, id. § 464 (ftrst-degree sexual offense); id. § 464A (second-degree sexual 
offense), since these sections are never mentioned in the marital defense statute, id. § 4640, and 
they lead to penalties comparable to the rape offenses. The only problem with this construction 
is that Maryland's fust- and second-degree sexual offense statutes only cover particular kinds of 
"sexual act[s]"; they do not cover vaginal intercourse. See id. § 461(e) (deftning "[s]exual act" as 
"cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse"). 
Treating these "sexual acts" as capable of prosecution against a spouse, although vaginal 
intercourse is not, yields a rather odd result. In any event, it remains the case that the "rape" 
offenses are not available to charge the spousal defendant unless there is a showing of force, id. 
§ 464D(c), and that neither the sexual offenses statutes, id. §§ 464, 464A, nor the sexual contact 
offenses, id. §§ 464B, 464C, are available for an act of vaginal intercourse. See id. § 46l(f) 
(exempting from "sexual contact" penetration by "the penis, mouth, or tongue" into the 
"genital or anal opening of another person's body"). 
62. The spousal statute, id. § 464D(c), allows prosecution where the act is committed with 
force under three specifted offenses: section 462(a) (all subsections of ftrst-degree rape statute); 
section 463(a)(l) (first of three subsections of second-degree rape statute); and section 
464B(a)(l)(i)-(ii) (two subsections of the third-degree sexual offense statute) as long as the 
prosecution can show "force." The statute speciftcally bars prosecutions under non-enumerated 
subsections of 463 (second-degree rape), 464B (third-degree sexual offenses), and 464C (fourth-
degree sexual offenses) through the "marital defense," provided in section 464D(a). 
63. See supra note 60. 
64. There are a number of varying "lists" of the states that have marital rape 
differentials/immunities, see, e.g., Hasday, supra note 47, at 1 nn.l-3 (citing statutes); West, 
supra note 47, at 46-49 (citing statutes); but, without really examining the statutes in detail, it is 
often difficult to see how this is accomplished. 
65. See supra notes 43-45 (discussing equal protection cases). 
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challenges. Courts from Alabama to Illinois to New York have 
rejected the notion that the marital relationship of the parties 
somehow makes the offense less worthy of prosecution.66 They have 
called the reconciliation argument "absurd,"67 warning that "it is the 
violent act of rape and not the subsequent attempt of the wife to seek 
protection through the criminal justice system which 'disrupts' a 
marriage. "68 They have openly rejected the notion that marital rape 
should not be a crime because it is likely to lead to false charges, 
stating that "[t]here is no other crime we can think of in which all of 
the victims are denied protection simply because someone might 
fabricate a charge."69 They have denied that proof problems justify 
lack of equal treatment, finding that "the problem of proving lack of 
consent is likely to be present in most cases in which the alleged 
victim and perpetrator have had a prior consensual sexual 
relationship regardless of whether they were married or unmarried."70 
Finally, courts have been openly hostile to the notion of "privacy" as 
justifying marital differentials, asserting that "[w]hile protecting 
marital privacy and encouraging reconciliation are legitimate State 
interests, there is no rational relation between allowing a husband to 
forcibly rape his wife and these interests. "71 
Given this set of precedents and a constitutional basis for 
challenge,72 why do these statutes remain on the books? There are 
66. See supra notes 44-45. 
67. Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984) ("Weishaupt's third 
argument is that to allow a husband to be convicted of raping his wife will be disruptive to 
marriages. He contends that the possibility of reconciliation will be foreclosed. This argument is 
absurd." (emphasis added)); see also People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984) ("(I)t is 
not tenable to argue that elimination of the marital exemption would disrupt marriages because 
it would discourage reconciliation."). 
68. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574 (citing Weishaupt, 315 S.E.2d at 855); see also Merton v. 
State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (adopting Liberto's rationale); People v. 
M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 711-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("[I]f a marriage has deteriorated to the point 
where one spouse commits a forcible sexual assault upon the other and the victim desires to see 
the perpetrator imprisoned, reconciliation is hardly a likely prospect."). 
69. Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (Ga. 1985). The court also noted that "there is no 
evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys with revenge filled trumped-up charges." 
/d.; see also Merton, 500 So. 2d at 1304 ("(I]f the possibility of fabricated complaints were a basis 
for not crirninalizing behavior which would otherwise be sanctioned, virtually all crimes other 
than homicides would go unpunished."). 
70. M.D., 595 N.E.2d at 712. 
71. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 574; see also State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 906 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984) ("The marital privacy right recognized by the United States Supreme Court ... may 
not be used as a justification for immunity from prosecution for sexual battery."); 
Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A.2d 591, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) ("The right to privacy 
within the marital relationship is not absolute and, in this case, must be balanced against the 
state's interest in protecting an individual's right to the integrity of his or her own body."). 
72. Typically, a rational basis argument is very easy to rebut, simply requiring some 
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some practical reasons. First, potential victims have no standing to 
sue for equal protection violations, and defendants (who benefit from 
downgraded penalties and partial immunities) typically have no 
incentive to make such a claim. Male defendants brought the early 
claims; and once courts consistently refused to benefit them, 
defendants stopped making the claims. Thus, the constitutional 
norms that purportedly govern, norms of equality, have little clout. 
Second, as we have seen above, the discarded norms of relationship 
are powerfully resistant to change. Legislatures have been prodded 
in many jurisdictions to tinker with these rules, but the effort quickly 
encounters the very reasons rejected by courts as "illegitimate" or 
"illogical" or "absurd." Indeed, one reads of legislators giving voice 
explicitly to the notion that the relationship should control, echoing 
seemingly ancient sentiments that "[i]f you can't rape your wife, who 
can you rape?"73 
Third, and as important, there are places for these norms to hide. 
How could the average citizen/advocate/reformer possibly untangle 
the Maryland statute? Indeed, even for scholars of rape law, the time 
and effort to try to discover the precise interconnections between the 
exemptions and their relationship to general nonspousal statutes is 
relatively exhausting and largely unknown. It is within this 
complexity that the norms of relationship live on and hold court, 
albeit silently. Once within these statutes, moreover, this becomes a 
reason in and of itself to sustain the current system. The stratified 
rape law, which serves as the template for the marital rape 
immunities/4 is often favored by prosecutors as providing them with 
legitimate reason for the statute's distinctions. Interestingly enough here, the vast majority of 
courts addressing these statutes have been willing to find no "rational" basis. See supra notes 
43-44 (citing several cases where courts have found no rational basis to sustain marital 
exemption statutes). Some have found this less than comforting, finding that marital rape 
exemptions endure "despite their apparent unconstitutionality," because of the "inadequacy of 
the dominant or mainstream political theory of equality." See West, supra note 47, at 49-50. I 
do not disagree with that as an abstract matter; indeed, I believe that existing equal protection 
doctrine has failed to understand the way in which norms of intimate relationships must enter 
the equality analysis. My point here is simply that courts have not been timid in rejecting the 
most prevalent justifications for marital rape exemptions. That, in turn, sets up an interesting 
juxtaposition between a law that simultaneously rejects marital rape exemptions as "absurd" 
and, at the same time, lets them live on in statutes throughout the country. 
73. Eskow, supra note 23, at 689 (quoting 1979 statement of California State Senator Bob 
Wilson); see also id. at 696-97 (reporting statements in 1992 debate on California's marital rape 
statute suggesting legislators do not see the public treating a marital rape as seriously as a 
traditional rape). 
74. Rape law reform courted complexity in the 1970s and 1980s on the theory that many 
offenses of different grades would increase prosecutorial discretion and thus increase the 
chances of convictions. See Horney & Spohn, supra note 10, at 523 ("Many states replaced the 
single crime of rape with a series of offenses graded by seriousness and with commensurate 
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the most flexibility in deciding the appropriate charge and by defense 
counsel as providing the most lenient penalties. The parties who 
work "in the system" thus have little incentive to change and, indeed, 
have been found embracing separate marital rape treatment (even 
when it creates inequalities). Metanorms of flexibility and leniency 
become a friendly shield that allows legislators to avoid openly 
avowing what they really believe-that marital rape is a lesser crime. 
The discarded norms in which the relationship is more important than 
the violence still hold true; they simply remain hidden within 
complexity's claims for legitimacy. 
Professor Nancy Lemon's 1992 experience attempting to reform 
the California marital rape exemption is illustrative here.75 Among 
other things, Lemon sought three major reforms: (1) to bring parity to 
penalties for stranger and marital rape by eliminating the 
misdemeanor treatment for marital rape; (2) to eliminate the "prompt 
complaint" rule requiring notification of marital rapes within ninety 
days; and (3) to dissolve the "separate" marital rape statute.76 
Presumably, this should have been an easy reform, if the equal 
protection cases are any measure. And yet, it was a difficult process 
in which Lemon was never able to rid the law of the "separate" 
statute or to eliminate completely the prompt complaint rule.77 
Instead, reformers obtained felony treatment for forcible marital 
rapes by agreeing not to eliminate the separate spousal statute.78 As 
Lemon warned, separate rules for married women have required 
continued legislative attention and revision to avoid exacerbating or 
creating inequalities between the general and spousal statutes.79 
Who stood up for the "separate" treatment in California? The 
lawyers- the group that one might have thought would stand for 
constitutional norms of equality. Some of the arguments legislators 
penalties."). It was against this template of a graduated series of sexual offenses that reformers 
of the marital rape exemption found themselves working and in whose interstices one can find 
today's odd marital rape rules. 
75. See Krysten Crawford, Boalt Lecturer Rewrites the Rules on a Wife's Right to Say 'No', 
RECORDER, Nov. 22, 1993, at 3; Eskow, supra note 23, at 696-98 (describing Lemon's efforts). 
76. See Crawford, supra note 75, at 3. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. ("The new statute abolishes the misdemeanor penalty, making all marital rapes 
felonies punishable by up to eight years in prison .... The amended law didn't come without 
some important concessions, the most significant of which keeps California's marital and 
nonmarital rape laws as separate Penal Code sections."). 
79. See id. ("My discomfort," Lemon says, "is that as long as we have two separate code 
sections, non-marital rape [Penal Code §261] will be strengthened .... We will have to watch all 
rape bills like a hawk." (citing CAL. PENAL CODE§ 261 (West 1999)); Eskow, supra note 23, at 
697. 
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raised in support of separate treatment were the ones already rejected 
by courts (difficulties of proof, false claims, and the need to maintain 
marital relationships),80 but, in the end, the day was carried against 
reform not by these arguments but by their more veiled counterparts. 
The district attorneys' association, the criminal defense bar, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union all opposed various reforms of the 
marital rape statute and wanted to sustain its "separateness."81 They 
did not openly adhere to the discarded norms of yesteryear; instead, 
they claimed that the inequalities were really "better" for seemingly 
neutral reasons-better for defendants, better for an already 
overburdened criminal justice system, and, most interestingly, better 
for women. The complex, separate, and largely redundant statute-
however it symbolized the "difference" of marital rape-made it 
easier for prosecutors to prosecute, they said. As one prosecutor put 
it, "the relationship acts as mitigation,"82 making jurors perceive 
spousal rape as a crime less serious than nonspousal rape.83 That, of 
course, does not answer the question why the law should continue to 
perpetuate and express that view; it simply trades on the supposedly-
discarded position that the relationship discounts the violence and 
that the law can and should do nothing about it. 
In short, marital rape tells a story of discarded norms and how 
they continue to live. Here, they live on "between statutes" and 
because the resulting complexity is defended in apparently neutral, 
procedural terms. Competing metanorms of flexibility and ease of 
administration occlude the ways in which the norms of "relationship" 
continue to blind us to the nature of the violence, signify consent, and 
raise fears of false claims-the very arguments that courts rejected 
fifteen years ago in Liberta as untenable, absurd, and unfair.84 
Clothed within purportedly friendly arguments about the ease of 
prosecution and often blocked from constitutional challenge, the 
relationship remains normatively resilient. The result is a banal 
sexism in a world that believes sexism in the criminal law is dead, a 
world in which you can threaten to kill your wife, proceed to have sex 
against her will, and still commit something less than real rape. 
80. See Eskow, supra note 23, at 696-97. 
81. E-mail interview with Nancy Lemon, Jan. 10,2000. 
82. Eskow, supra note 23, at 701 (quoting Linda Eufusia, Deputy District Attorney in San 
Mateo County's Sexual Assault Unit). 
83. Seeid. 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71. 
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C. Battered Women and Self-Defense 
One of the very odd things about some feminist reforms in the 
criminal law is their ability to continue to generate controversy even 
after the reforms themselves have become ingrained in the law. For 
every "noncontroversial" feminist reform that stands unimplemented, 
there remain widely implemented reforms that continue to be 
"controversial." Battered woman syndrome evidence is the classic 
example. Almost every state in the nation now accepts battered 
woman syndrome testimony.85 Indeed, courts in many jurisdictions 
have used battered woman syndrome evidence as a template for 
nonfeminist claims-claims of siblings, children, and even parents.86 
Whether or not those rulings are correct, they exist and are not 
particularly controversial for courts (even if they should be). 
The question this raises is why courts have so willingly embraced 
battered woman syndrome evidence while controversy about the 
syndrome increases in intensity. There is more writing deeply 
skeptical of the syndrome than ever before. Scholars, writing both for 
academic and popular audiences, have reviled the syndrome, urging 
that it lacks scientific validity, wreaks havoc with the law of self-
defense, and may help to excuse executioners.87 Feminist reform 
remains oddly questionable, somehow illegitimate, and apparently 
political even though courts and legislatures have accepted syndrome 
evidence quite easily. The gist of the argument centers on the 
implication that the syndrome effectively changes the law "for 
battered women" and provides them a "special defense." As a legal 
85. As of 1995, one study found that "[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects" had 
been held admissible, at least in part, in "each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia" and 
that "[t]welve states have enacted statutes providing for the admissibility of expert testimony." 
Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal Cases, 
11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 81-83 (1996}. The report noted, however, that "18 states have also 
excluded expert testimony in some cases." /d. at 83. 
86. See, e.g., State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998) (battered child syndrome 
evidence admissible in case of child accused of murdering parent); People v. Colberg, 701 
N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1999) (battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of 
father accused of murdering adult son); Commonwealth v. Kacsmar, 617 A.2d 725 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1992) (battered person syndrome evidence admissible in case of fratricide); State v. Janes, 
850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993} (battered child syndrome evidence admissible in case of child 
accused of murdering parent). 
87. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 5, at 56 ("The position that so many judges and legislators 
have taken is scientifically suspect, philosophically debatable, and legally unnecessary."); id. at 
62-66 (discussing battered women's nonconfrontational killings and suggesting that changes in 
the law authorize "private, paid executions" in such cases); Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 
76-79 (questioning the validity of studies supporting battered woman syndrome and concluding, 
id. at 79, that "the integrity of legal doctrine has suffered immensely from the syndrome's 
spread across the landscape."). 
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matter, this is not correct; there is no separate "battered women's" 
defense and courts routinely insist that they are not changing the 
law.88 And yet, doubts about this conclusion persist in the academic 
literature.89 
The problem with all of this lies in the overarching assumption 
that the syndrome implicitly aims to "change" the law of self-defense 
in ways that are, at best, political or favoritist. I believe that there is 
reason to doubt that normative claim. Indeed, for the student of self-
defense law, the legal norms embodied in the syndrome are so 
conventional that if one were to encapsulate the syndrome in a set of 
jury instructions (rather than in expert psychological testimony), what 
you would end up with could all be supported by nineteenth-century 
law citations. The syndrome does many things: among them, it 
emphasizes the importance of past threats and the severity of the 
anticipated harm. Perhaps more importantly, it attempts to rebut the 
claim that the defendant should have left and focuses the jury on the 
defendant's perception of the events and her situation.90 There is 
nothing inconsistent between any of these notions, however, and 
established self-defense law. Since the nineteenth century, past 
threats and violence, including the victim's character for violence, 
have been considered highly relevant to a claim of self-defense, on 
questions of imminence, aggression, and threat.91 In 1888, courts 
would charge juries that the reasonable person is not to be judged by 
some "ideal" standard but that the jury was "to put themselves in the 
position of the assailed person, with his physical and mental 
equipment, surrounded with the circumstances and exposed to the 
influences with which he was surrounded, and to which he was 
exposed at the time."92 Similarly, it was well established then that the 
88. See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (Ohio 1990) ("Thus, admission of expert 
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome does not establish a new defense or 
justification. Rather, it is to assist the trier of fact [to] deterrnin[e] whether the defendant acted 
out of an honest belief that she was in imminent danger .... "). 
89. See supra note 87. 
90. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 82-88; Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and 
Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 
426-27 (1991); Parrish, supra note 85, at 85. 
/d. 
91. See, e.g., People v. Thomson, 28 P. 589,590 (Cal. 1891). The court stated that 
[ u ]nder these circumstances, all the acts and conduct of the deceased, either in the 
nature of overt acts of hostility or threats communicated or uncomrnunicated, were 
proper evidence to be considered by the jury as shedding light-to some extent at 
least-upon the issue as to whether the deceased or the defendant was the aggressor in 
this fatal affray. These principles are elementary in criminal law, and a citation of 
authorities not demanded .... 
92. United States v. King, 34 F. 302, 309 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1888). The jury was charged as 
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defendant's perception of the victim's threat, rather than an actual 
threat, was sufficient to establish self-defense if the perception was 
reasonable (indeed, this was and still is known as the "appearances" 
rule).93 Finally, it was well established that one does not 
automatically provoke an incident or become an aggressor by walking 
into a dangerous situation or staying in a dangerous place-whether 
that dangerous situation is a barroom brawl or a shootout at the O.K. 
Corral. There is no pre-retreat rule for dangerous situations, 
marriages included.94 
If this is true, and the syndrome's legal propositions95 are not 
terribly controversial,96 this may help explain why so many courts 
have been so willing to accept the substance of the expert testimony 
even if there remain commentators that express recurring doubts 
about its form as a "syndrome" or its necessity as "expert" 
testimony.97 But, more importantly, courts may have gravitated 
toward this testimony because judges have a vague, unarticulated 
intuition that the rules work well for strangers but not for those 
involved in intimate relationships. I recently conducted a study of 
self-defense cases that attempts to show that the reason the rules do 
not work well is because the relationship between the parties provides 
follows: 
/d. 
[I]n determining whether it is founded on reasonable grounds, the jury are not to 
conceive of some ideally reasonable person, but they are to put themselves in the 
position of the assailed person, with his physical and mental equipment, surrounded 
with the circumstances and exposed to the influences with which he was surrounded, 
and to which he was exposed at the time. If, with these tests applied ... the jury are 
satisfied that there was then an apparently imminent danger of death or grievous 
bodily harm to the person assailed, he is entitled to act upon the appearances. 
93. See id. 
94. See, e.g., Ball v. State, 29 Tex. App. 107, 125-26 (Tex. Ct. App. 1890) ("Defendant's 
presence at the place where the killing occurred could not, under the circumstances, constitute 
provocation to the deceased."); State v. Bristol, 53 Wyo. 304 (1938) (Defendant had no duty to 
avoid entering a bar where he knew his adversary-who had threatened to attack him-to be 
drinking.); ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 147 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that 
English self-defense law protects the freedom to move, excepting from the duty to avoid 
violence, claims "in those cases where (the defendant] is acting lawfully in remaining at, or going 
to, a place" and that American law "takes the point further"). 
95. The emphasis here is on the "legal propositions" for which the syndrome stands. As 
can readily be noted by my summary, I make absolutely no claim about the psychological 
validity of the syndrome, a topic on which I have no opinion nor the expertise to entertain one. 
96. Curiously, those who do know something about self-defense law have noted the 
seeming parallels between the syndrome and self-defense law, and cite those parallels as a 
reason to condemn the syndrome. See Faigman & Wright, supra note 5, at 88-89 ("(T]he 
syndrome so closely parallels the law of self-defense that its basic parameters appear to be 
controlled more by legal convenience than by psychological observation or theory."). 
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
2000] THE "NORMAL" SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF FEMINISM 973 
the norms, and those norms overwhelm the law.98 Let's face it, 
battered women's cases are about the legal relevance of leaving. 
Judges and juries want battered women to leave before they kill (as 
we all do). The important question for most battered women's cases, 
however, is the legal relevance of departure to the standard case of 
confrontational self-defense. The man who walks into the dangerous 
bar for the fiftieth time or walks into a dangerous neighborhood for 
the eightieth does not lose his self-defense claim because he should 
have "left" before the knife was above his head.99 If the law is 
imposing such a rule on battered women in confrontational situations, 
then it is imposing a special disadvantage on those women, not a 
special advantage. Under this view, the syndrome becomes a kind of 
"normal" corrective to a law whose normative references risk 
unbalance: in confrontational cases, something like the syndrome, 
perhaps simply in the form of jury instructions, is necessary to remind 
the law of self-defense of its own commitments. Put another way, 
such testimony is necessary to rebut the implicit norm that there is a 
"pre-retreat" rule, a rule requiring defendants to "leave" dangerous 
places or relationships simply because they are dangerous.HJO 
To see the power of the norms demanding "departure" -in what 
should be a classic self-defense situation-consider the case of 
Barbara Watson.101 Watson was on the ground, and her husband's 
hands "around [her] neck," but the trial court found that she did not 
kill in self-defense because the threat against her was not 
"imminent."102 (Self-defense generally requires a finding that the 
defendant used deadly force only when faced with an imminent threat 
of death or great bodily harm.)103 As the appellate court reported it, 
the trial judge believed the threat was not imminent because of "[his] 
view of the parties' relationship involving 'a long course of physical 
98. Victoria F. Nourse, Killing Time (draft manuscript, on file with author) (analyzing self-
defense cases raising the issue of "imminence"). 
99. See supra note 94. 
101). If I am correct, it would contravene basic self-defense law not to give an instruction 
that explained to the jury the difference between a retreat rule (which some states require in the 
event of confrontation) and a pre-retreat rule, which would require the defendant to avoid 
dangerous situations altogether. 
101. Commonwealth v. Watson, 431 A.2d 949, 950-51 (Pa. 1981). 
102 /d. at 951. As the Watson court emphasized, "[t]he central issue in this case stems from 
the trial court's fmding that appellant's belief-that she was in imminent danger ... was 
unreasonable." /d. (emphasis added). 
103. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTI, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CR!MINAL LAW§ 5.7 
(1986). 
974 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:951 
abuse."'104 Put bluntly, the trial judge thought Watson should have 
left before her husband's hands were around her neck. Of course, he 
did not express it that way. He used the apparently neutral, but quite 
difficult, imminence category and filled it up with social norms about 
Watson's "proper" relationship to her husband and her responsibility 
for that relationship. Indeed, in reversing, this is precisely what the 
appellate court found,105 rejecting as questionable the notion that the 
violence could not be "imminent" because of the "parties' 
relationship. "HJ6 
To be sure, Watson's case may be unusual.I07 But that it could 
happen at all suggests the ability of the norms of relationship to 
overpower the law's own commitments as well as the ease with which 
such norms are hidden- here, within the concept of "imminence." 
The Watson trial court could not possibly have held as it did without 
believing that "imminence" amounted to a kind of "leave-him-first" 
rule, a rule imposing responsibility for the relationship, including its 
violence, on the defendant. But there were many ways in which the 
doctrine might have lent some apparent (although ultimately 
unavailing) support to that conclusion. The law of self-defense does 
often require that the defendant avoid the violence once it starts 
(sometimes known as the retreat rule).l08 Similarly, the law does 
reject the self-defense claims of those who "provoke" the violence or 
104. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951. I have left out here, but do not mean to slight, the end of this 
sentence which indicates that the trial court also believed that the defendant's response was 
disproportionate since the victim did not have a weapon. Id. It is well-established self-defense 
law, however, without regard to battered women, that a physical struggle, particularly where the 
parties are of unequal size or physical capacity, may be met with deadly force. See State v. 
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 556,558-59 (Wash. 1977) (en bane). 
105. Watson, 431 A.2d at 951-52 ("A woman whose husband has repeatedly subjected her to 
physical abuse does not, by choosing to maintain her family relationship with that husband and 
their children, consent to or assume the risk of further abuse."). 
106. I d. at 951. 
107. Watson is not unusual in one sense: the tendency to use "intminence" as a catch-all to 
incorporate a number of the other requirements of self-defense law (including retreat rules in 
nonretreat jurisdictions) is not limited to the battered women's cases; if my research is right, it is 
a common feature of self-defense cases. Indeed, contrary to the general assumption, the vast 
majority of appellate cases raising irnrninence as a relevant legal issue are not cases of 
nonconfrontational homicide-cases in which battered women or others kill long after the last 
threat. Indeed, this goes a long way to showing that imminence does not, as conventionally 
assumed, simply amount to "clock time." It is precisely because the clock is not at issue-
because the hands are around the defendants' necks-that intminence takes on other meanings, 
as it has since its origins in the early common law notion of "sudden affray." See Nourse, supra 
note 98. 
108. This rule applies in a minority of jurisdictions; it has proven to be of continuing 
controversy throughout the history of the law of self-defense. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret 
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 429-35 (1999). 
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create the conditions of their own defense.109 The only problem with 
these "legitimate" reasons is that, when applied to the relationship 
(and not the violence), they create a rule that the law has never 
announced-that a woman loses her right of self-defense merely 
because she is married. 
Unfortunately, lawyerly conventions themselves may be 
responsible for this state of affairs. Addressing the problems of self-
defense in general, academics and lawyers, feminists and nonfeminists 
alike, have focused on the question whether the law should soften its 
standards for the odd and difficult cases involving battered women 
who kill their sleeping husbands long after the threat has long 
subsided.U0 Talk of self-defense thus becomes a question of whether 
the legal standard is appropriately subjective or objective. This 
discourse does a fine job of providing a conclusion (subjectivity 
equals bad; objectivity equals good), but it tells us very little about 
what the content of the rules should be and, crucially, what we really 
mean by "necessary" self-defense (in battered women's cases or 
anyone else's). Must a defendant really exhaust all "legal 
alternatives" before exercising the right of self-defense? The law has 
never uniformly required this. If we believed such an "avoid-
violence-at-all-costs" rule were appropriate, then why is it 
noncontroversial that we have no shoot-'em-in-the-foot rule; or why 
have a majority of jurisdictions rejected a retreat rule? When we say 
of self-defense that it is necessary, why do almost all jurisdictions 
allow people to kill in the face of a threat that they know is serious 
but not life-threatening? 
These questions recede in importance, however, once objectivity 
and subjectivity become the central focus. Perspective, rather than 
meaning, becomes the controlling issue. And, once that is the 
question, it follows fairly clearly that urging justice for battered 
women means seeking a political, self-interested, and weaker 
109. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 103. 
110. One of the premises of the debate, albeit one for which there is little empirical support, 
is that battered women's cases are, like Judy Norman's, primarily ones of long-delayed 
homicidal attacks. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-
Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REv. 619, 621 (1986) ("Frequently, however, 
a battered woman kills her mate after an attack has ended or at some time when, seemingly, no 
immediate threat is present."); Cathryn Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a 
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 11, 43 (1986) 
("Most battered woman's defense cases involve situations in which the defendant was not, in 
fact, in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm at her victim's hands."). But see 
Maguigan, supra note 90 (arguing that most appellate cases involve confrontational, rather than 
nonconfrontational claims). 
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standard for the "weaker" sex. When this issue is framed as one of 
subjectivity and objectivity, the only thing about which we can argue 
is whether the rules are really rules or exceptions, rather than the 
content of those rules. In this sense, subjectivity/objectivity talk 
keeps the syndrome controversial. Because the only legal basis on 
which the syndrome appears to rest is "subjectivity," it always 
appears as politics in legal guise. 
The story of battered woman syndrome is a story like the ones I 
have recounted: we have vague legal concepts harboring unresolved 
social norms, sometimes disavowing and even contradicting the law's 
overt commitments. The law of self-defense does not generally 
require that the defendant "leave" before the attack has started; it 
clearly disavows the notion that married women lose their right of 
self-defense; and, by embracing syndrome evidence, it even attempts 
to rebut juries' implicit judgments that a battered woman must leave 
the relationship before the deadly attack. And, yet, these overt 
commitments may be shattered by social norms that demand, like 
they did of Barbara Watson, precisely the contrary-norms that are 
not openly stated but instead are disguised in the apparently objective 
judgments of imminence and necessity. 
In summary, all of these problems are exacerbated here, not by 
the processes of legislative reform, but by the habits of the legal 
academy and courts. Debate about the syndrome has tended to 
revolve around whethe:.: it creates a "special" rule for women in 
significant part because of the prevalence of objectivity/subjectivity 
discourse. There is good reason to suspect, however, that this 
discourse leads to diversion. Battered women's cases-whether 
confrontational or nonconfrontational-raise difficult questions 
because the law of self-defense is neither as transparent nor as settled 
as many hope or believe, and because the resulting ambiguities are 
vulnerable to powerful social norms. The great unanswered questions 
of self-defense law-questions about the meaning of imminence and 
retreat and necessity- are not likely to be resolved by a debate about 
subjectivity and objectivity. And, as long as they are not resolved, 
these meanings may well be provided not by the law's best judgments, 
but by society's worst judgments-by societal norms about 
relationships that contradict the law's own aspirations. 
CONCLUSION 
It simply defies reality to conclude that there has not been 
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significant feminist reform in the criminal law- there has. The 
interesting and challenging part is to understand how and when 
success lives with failure. This is worth investigating in its own right 
so that we may better understand the odd, discontinuities of reform 
rather than simply assuming the impossibility of change or the ease of 
effectuating it. 
I have argued that feminism contests powerful social norms 
about intimate relationships, which makes reform intensely 
controversial in very personal ways. People resist feminism because it 
seems to place them in positions in which they may have to question 
their most intimate relationships, their identity, and their daily lives. 
At the same time, this resistance, when overcome by legal reform, is 
likely to remain embedded in reform efforts, albeit in ways that are 
difficult to see, helping to perpetuate that which the law openly 
disavows. 
Perhaps it is no wonder, then, that we live in a world of feminist 
success and failure in the criminal law. The resulting inequalities, 
however, should be cause for great concern not only among feminists, 
but also among criminal law scholars generally. Social norms of 
inequality have tended to perpetuate themselves in the criminal law, 
despite the law's disavowals for reasons beyond feminism itself. First, 
constitutional litigation, a typical source of normative challenge, 
provides little relief for crime victims; not only is it very difficult for 
potential victims to get into court to assert an equal protection claim, 
but the federal courts remain wedded to the principle that they do not 
want to "involve" themselves in the substantive criminal law 
(particularly criminal laws affecting women) lest they become courts 
of domestic jurisdiction.111 Second, the norm-entrepreneurs of the 
criminal law academy have remained largely silent. At least until 
quite recently, the entire idea that norms could or did affect the 
criminal law was seen as "off limits," as a kind of terrible 
acknowledgment of the power of the community to destroy the 
individual. Criminal law theory is deeply positivistic; it proceeds 
upon the assumption that social norms are not the business of the law 
itself but in fact must be relegated to the institutional world of the 
111. See, e.g., Rehnquist: Is Federalism Dead?, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 12. The 
Legal Times reported Chief Justice Rehnquist's remarks before the American Law Institute, 
which were critical of efforts in Congress to increase the criminal law jurisdiction of the federal 
courts on the grounds that these matters should be left to the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
included the Violence Against Women Act, a civil rights remedy, within his catalog of "criminal 
law" statutes. See id. 
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jury. When theory blinds itself to the power of norms to change and 
affect law, it pushes legal reform into theoretically unstable positions. 
Even reforms that are widely accepted by courts are somehow seen as 
"political" (in the pejorative sense of that term) rather than 
principled.112 
Feminist reform has been generating, and no doubt will continue 
to generate, discontinuous results in the criminal law and elsewhere. 
By this, I mean that the old discarded norms will live on beside the 
new ones, beckoning as if in perpetual challenge. If this is right, 
judgments of any statutory reform's futility or success must be issued 
with caution. At the same time, there is no reason for a sense of 
defeatism or of failed feminism. In urging that reform's failures may 
be "normal," I am simply suggesting that legal reform is a work in 
progress. Statutory reform rarely ends anything. It may transform 
the debate, yet it would be naive to believe that it could "end" a 
matter as ancient as sexism. This does not mean that reform is futile, 
but it may simply mean that reform demands perpetual vigilance. To 
paraphrase Reva Siegel (in another context): "[s]o long as we view 
[reform] in static and homogenous terms ... it is plausible to imagine 
ourselves at the end of history, finally and conclusively repudiating 
centuries of racial and gender inequality."113 For reformers, there is 
no time to pause as if we are at "the end of history." There simply is 
too much "unfinished business" in the criminal law. 
112 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 5, at 68, 112 (criticizing battered women's claims as 
seeking to "invent a new standard of personal accountability," id. at 68, and suggesting the 
acceptance of these claims is "[m]otivated by empathy for some group of disadvantaged 
defendants," id. at 112). 
113. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1997). 
